Research on the Dynamic Adjustment of Financial Subsidies and the Decision making of Precast Construction in Villages and Towns by Wang
Abstract: Under the dual national strategic goals of “high-quality development” and “rural revitalization”, the orderly promotion of precast buildings in villages and towns cannot be separated from the support of local government financial subsidies This article discovers from a practical perspective that both policy demanders (precast building manufacturers, rural residents) and policy suppliers (local governments) have formed a strategic state of “supporting those who are weak” and “withdrawing those who advance” based on subsidy policies.
Evolutionary game theory is used to analyze the bidirectional linkage between the two decisions, and subsidy rates are set to characterize the participation status of fiscal subsidies.
Simulation simulations are conducted using actual project data The research results indicate that: 1) The degree of fiscal subsidies in the development process of precast buildings in villages and towns presents a “inverted U-shaped” relationship of “first strengthening and then weakening” 2) There exists a policy embedding (withdrawal) rate to achieve optimal subsidy performance.